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Satanic Cases: A Means of Confronting the Law's
Immorality
Stephan A. Landsman*
His offer had contained an old question: What kind of idea are you?
And she, in turn, had offered him an old answer. I was tempted, but
am renewed ....
-Salman Rushdie1
The epigraph of this Article is taken from Salman Rushdie's
marvelous novel, The Satanic Verses. It presents one of the important themes of Rushdie's book, that the allure of worldly power
or acclaim often induces the sacrifice of fundamental principles. It
will be my argument that the temptation to abandon essential
values is particularly serious for lawyers because the structure of
the law allows them to wield immense power without confronting
the injurious consequences of their actions. To address this danger legal education ought to focus on the importance of individual integrity in the courtroom process. Unfortunately, law schools
have generally not done so.
The "ordinary religion" of the law school classroom is skeptical, instrumental, and tough-minded.2 It usually avoids consideration of complex moral questions.. Most classes, certainly those in
the core curriculum, concentrate on hypotheticals and appellate
opinions that have been stripped of serious moral content. This
approach deprives law teachers of the opportunity to talk about
values and impoverishes legal education.
In order to understand why the absence of moral dialogue
from legal education is a serious problem it is necessary to recognize two critical propositions. The first of these was provided by

* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. I
would like to thank a number of colleagues and friends for their generous assistance in
reviewing earlier drafts of this piece, including David Barnhizer, Roger Cramton, Edward
Imwinkelried, and Nancy Klein.
1 S. RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES 500 (1st Am. printing 1989) (emphasis in original indicated above with ordinary roman type).
2 See Cramton, The Ordinay Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC.
247, 248 (1978).
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the social psychologist Stanley Milgram. In the 1960s Dr. Milgram
conducted a series of experiments exploring the human inclination to obey authority. Milgram sought to determine whether
subjects could be persuaded "to carry out a series of acts that
[came] increasingly into conflict with conscience."
The subjects of Milgram's work were told that as part of a
study concerning the effects of punishment on learning they were
to administer increasingly severe electric shocks to others apparently participating in the exercises. Milgram found that despite
the ever more agonized protests of the person seemingly suffering
the shocks, about two-thirds of his subjects would continually increase voltage at the direction of a gray-coated experimenter.4
Milgram concluded that:
[O]rdinary people, simply doing their jobs, and without any
particular hostility on their part, can become agents in a terrible destructive process. Moreover, even when the destructive
effects of their work become patently clear, and they are asked
to carry out actions incompatible with fundamental standards
of morality, relatively few people have the resources needed to
resist authority.5
The second proposition of importance is drawn from the
work of Professor Robert Cover. In an article published shortly
after his untimely death, Cover argued that "[liegal interpretation
takes place in a field of pain and death."6 As Cover demonstrated, what judges do involves the imposition of violence upon litigants. The whole legal endeavor is concerned with the infliction
of pain. To recognize this fact is not to concede that such adjudicatory consequences are illegitimate but simply to understand
their intrinsically hurtful effect. Unfortunately, the bureaucratic
nature of judicial activity often leads judges and lawyers to become insensitive to the suffering they inflict. Because the structure of the legal system usually relieves lawyers from personally
experiencing or even witnessing the consequences of their acts
"the pain and fear are remote, unreal, and largely unshared."7
Like the subjects in Milgram's experiments, lawyers feel insulated
from the injuries they cause and may "act violently without expe-
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S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENcE To AUTHoRITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 3 (1974).
Id.at 35.
Id. at 6.
Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1629.
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riencing the normal inhibitions."' In any such setting the risk of
doing unwarranted harm is greatly magnified.
Nothing in traditional legal education prepares students to
deal with the erosion of inhibitions. In fact the conventional curriculum and its pedagogy reinforce a set of attitudes that increase
the likelihood of dutifully amoral behavior. The practices of the
traditional classroom accentuate obedience to authority. The instructor using what law teachers call the "Socratic" method dominates the process, dictating the matters to be discussed and the
manner in which they will be considered. The process highlights
the teacher's knowledge and the students' ignorance. Challenges
to the instructor's authority are not generally encouraged. This
arrangement introduces students to a hierarchical structure strikingly similar to the one young lawyers will later encounter in the
courtroom.
The conventional curriculum emphasizes the value of abstract
rules and discourages reliance on personal values.' John Noonan
has suggested where this approach leads: "Fascination with rules
may mean obeisance to force or the delusion of having mastered
force. It may also lead to a veritably religious veneration for the
rules and their imagined author. The sovereign and his command
may be deified."'" Such an arrangement increases the risk that
those trained in the law wil be compliant participants in injurious
activities. Noonan says this occurs because lawyers use the rules as
an excuse to disregard or "mask" the humanity of those to whom
proscriptions are applied."
Traditional legal education has other alienating effects as well.
It teaches a skeptical attitude that all too easily leads to a profound nihilism. 12 It encourages an unprincipled instrumentalism
that sees everything from a technical perspective." The result is
that "students become more isolated, suspicious, and verbally aggressive as they progress through law school."' 4
Unfortunately, neither trial advocacy training by means of
simulation nor live client clinical education has been particularly
effective at curbing these tendencies or placing critical value ques-

8

Id. at 1615.

9

See Cramton, supra note 2, at 256.
J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAw 13 (1976).
Id. at 19.
See Cramton, supra note 2, at 253-54.
See id. at 257-58.
Id. at 262.
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tions on the law school agenda. Simulation training tends to emphasize technique even more than its traditional counterpart. 5
Simulation materials, because of their hypothetical nature, encourage students to adopt a cavalier attitude toward truth and to treat
the practice of law as a game.16 Such attitudes cannot assist students in recognizing, let alone overcoming, the sort of dangers
identified by Milgram and Cover.
Clinical education and simulation both rely on a hierarchical
approach virtually identical to that used in the traditional classroom. Obedience to directions is strongly stressed. 7 The general
tendency of both the clinical and simulation approaches is to "inculcate that spontaneous disposition to conform to occupational
norms which is a hallmark of [legal] professionalism." 8 Even
putting these issues to one side, clinical experience poses such
immediate and urgent demands that, as Noonan says in a somewhat different context, there is great "incentive to disguise, rationalize, or accommodate." 9 Students involved in the clinical experience are not likely to find any answers to their sense of alienation or substantial encouragement to resist pressures to conform
to bureaucratic expectations."0 William Simon found that clinical
students were imprisoned rather than liberated by their experience. The students he observed had "both an acute consciousness
of the lawyer role as frightening and personally oppressive and a
complete inability to envision any alternative to it besides moral
and social anarchy."2 '
How should we respond to the problems of alienation from
values and willingness to do evil? It is precisely these questions
that Salman Rushdie set out to address in his novel. The Satanic
Verses "is the story of two painfully divided selves."22 The first is
Saladin Chamcha, a secular man who has lost his social moorings

15 See generally Hegland, Moral Dilemmas in Teaching Trial Advocacy, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 69, 72 (1982); Lubet, What We Should Teach (But Don't) When We Teach Trial Advocacy, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 123 (1987).
16 See Hegland, supra note 15, at 72.
17 See Condlin, *Tastes Great, Less Filling'."The Law School Clinic and Political Critique,
36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45, 53-59 (1986).
18 Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formnalism, 32 STAN. L REV. 487,
526 (1980).
19 J. NOONAN, supra note 10, at 38.
20 See Simon, supra note 18, at 538.
21 Id.
22 Rushdie, In Good Faith, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12, 1990, at 53 (in this piece Rushdie
provides a lengthy description, analysis, and defense of his novel).
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and is torn between the culture of his birthplace, Bombay, and
his chosen home, London. Chamcha struggles to integrate the two
sets of values (South Asian and English) that define his life. His
alienation from both worlds is made wonderfully tangible by
Rushdie in the early part of The Satanic Verses when Chamcha is
transformed into a goat-footed, horned devil who is held prisoner
in a British sanatorium filled with monstrously chimerical creatures, all of whom have been "demonized by the 'host culture's'
attitude to them."2" This image captures the terrible alienating
power of a society to divide people against themselves and the
limits of human ability to overcome alienation. Chamcha eventually escapes the sanatorium. After great turmoil and violent infliction of serious injury on those around him Chamcha begins to
reintegrate his life. Rushdie argues that for Chamcha to succeed
he must come to terms with the demonic version of himself. He
is not free simply to adopt the accents and ways of his new
home.

24

The second character of critical importance to The Satanic
Verses is Gibreel Farishta ("Gabriel Angel"). 25 He suffers from "a
rift in the soul," a loss of religious faith despite "his immense
need to believe." 26 His dilemma is dramatized in a series of
dreams that he finds "agonizingly painful." 27 These dreams present a caricature of various aspects of the early history of Islam. At
the heart of the dreams is an incident Rushdie describes as "quasi-historical" in which the dream version of Mohammed, named
Mahound, is briefly tempted to admit three female pagan gods
into the Islamic pantheon. 21 The temptation is embodied in a set
of "satanic verses" of scripture which exert a powerful pull on
Mahound. If Mahound embraces the satanic scriptures he may
advance his worldly program. Mahound resists this temptation but
Farishta, the dreamer, cannot come to terms with his loss of faith
and is eventually destroyed. To look forthrightly at the satanic

23 Id. at 54.
24 Rushdie vividly describes this by having Chaincha begin the novel as an actor
who is particularly adept at mimicking all sorts of English accents. As his personal crisis
deepens the accents and words of his native India intrude and must be consciously reintegrated into his speech.
25 Rushdie, supra note 22, at 53.
26 Id
27 Id.
28 Id. at 54.
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the temptation it represents is critical to "rectext and overcome
29
lamation."
The Satanic Verses argues that in order for a person to live a
decent life he must recognize and master the demon that society
would make of him. The novel's main characters are placed, at
least metaphorically, in positions not unlike the ones young lawyers are likely to face. Educators will find that following Rushdie's
paradigm by identifying legal temptation and teaching students
how to face it is no simple matter. As The Satanic Verses eloquently demonstrates, tangible embodiments of temptation are most
likely to facilitate the process. For lawyers there would seem to be
no better embodiments of temptation than satanic cases. Satanic
cases are legal proceedings which graphically present the moral
risks lawyers face. An appropriate place to begin looking for such
cases is in the annals of famous trials.3 0 Here one may find the
sorts of real world stories that embody both temptation and resistance.
A number of legal writers have championed the didactic potential of real case stories or narratives. Robert Cover has suggested that "[n]o set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart
from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning."3' In such
fundamental narratives, "the trajectories" of experience are plotted. 2 Through them the meanings and implications of legal behavior and the myths which define the parameters of that behavior may be traced. All narratives are not equally valuable in this
quest, but the truly paradigmatic may capture our "reality" and
"vision."" Such narratives provide the "models through which we
study," in simplified form, the implications of our actions and our
laws. 4 Cover finds them in a number of places but most particularly in case studies, 5 especially those concerning "martyr36
dom."

29 Id.
30 See Twining, Cannibalism and Legal Literature, 6 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 423, 425
(1986).
31 Cover, The Supreme Cour4 1982 Term-Forewordi Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 4 (1983).
32 Id. at 5.
33 Id. at 9-10.
34 Id. at 10.
35 Id. See also R. COVER, JusTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1975).
36 See Cover, supra note 6, at 1604-05.
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John Noonan also emphasizes the value of case studies. He
has argued that perhaps as much as half of all legal education
should concentrate on the stories behind legal disputes.3 7 He has
urged this approach because he believes that only in the study of
the persons and actions behind legal opinions may we glimpse the
human reality of the law. According to Noonan, taking rules and
decisions at face value perpetuates the masks that the law often
creates. Noonan contends that the law creates these masks to hide
the harmful human consequences of its actions. Only if the masks
are pulled away, and the historical reality of legal action is exposed, can a better understanding be achieved. Exploring the
cases in this manner may serve a critical "heuristic" function, if
those who study such cases can avoid "despair or terror" at what
they find." Studying the cases this way may awaken a recognition of the "evil" that law can do and "improve our present vision.""
Finding the sort of cases that will reward such study is a
complicated undertaking. The solution is not found in simply
selecting the very worst possible adjudicatory behavior. The most
terrible cases, like the purge trials instigated by Stalin in the
1930s,40 teach very little, except that trialsi like any other human
activity, may be turned into murderous charades. This lesson neither requires deep analysis nor provides great insight. Instead,
these cases are likely to cause the sort of "despair or terror"
Noonan warns against.
In Justice Accused, a powerful study of the impact of abolitionist sentiment upon the judicial process, Cover suggests that the
most didactically useful courtroom confrontations are those in
which two elements are present. The first is a substantial divergence between legal principles and felt moral norms. 41 The second is a "dialectical environment" in which judges are pulled in
several directions by the ideological tenor of the advocacy used in
the cases before them, the potential for extralegal consequences

(like civil disobedience), and the sympathetic character of the

37 See Noonan, Cannibalism and the Common Law, 63 TEXAS L REV. 749, 752 (1984).
38 J. NOONAN, supra note 10, at 28. For Noonan's discussion of masks, see generally id. at 3-28.
39 Id at 28.
40 See generally PL CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR: STALIN'S PURGE OF THE THIRTIES
(1968).
41 See R. COVER, suPra note 35, at 201-10.
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subjects of judicial action.4 2 Cover's categories are designed to
explore why and how certain legal adjudications in the abolitionist
struggle led to a crisis of judicial conscience in America in the
1850s and 1860s. The categories may, nonetheless, also provide
some guidelines that help identify the sorts of cases, from any
era, that dramatically pose questions about legal morality and the
proper limits of authority.
As Cover emphasizes, the appropriate cases present a test of
moral will. They embody a conflict between a personal sense of
justice or decency and a set of discordant social demands. Quite
frequently the social demands arise out of a cluster of biases or
prejudices held by an elite or majority, willing to sacrifice individual defendants in the name of some allegedly greater social good.
Going a step beyond Cover, it may be fair to say that the essence
of such cases is their dialectical nature which embodies a contest
between social prejudice and personal conscience. Lionel Trilling
has advanced an almost identical proposition about the work of
certain artists. He has argued:
A culture is not a flow, nor even a confluence; the form of its
existence is struggle, or at least debate-it is nothing if not a
dialectic. And in any culture there are likely to be certain artists who contain a large part of the dialectic within themselves,
their meaning and power lying in their contradictions; they
contain within themselves, it may be said, the very essence of
the culture, and the sign of this is that they do not submit to
serve the ends of any one ideological group or tendency."
The slave cases Cover analyzed have this dialectical quality. By
studying them one may gain profound insights about society's
inclination to dictate injurious and morally dubious results in the
name of social objectives like obedience to law and political harmony. Yet those who act in such cases are often keenly aware of
the injustice, even martyrdom, they impose and the cases frequently provide, albeit at tragic cost, a demonstration of the
wrongheadedness of prevailing social attitudes.
Such cases, which might be described as embodiments of the
satanic urge in the law, are to be found in almost every era in
American legal history.44 A brief description of two such cases

42 See id. at 211-16.
43 L TRILLING, Reality in America, in THE LIBERAL IMAGINATION: ESSAYS ON LITERATURE AND SOCIETY 9 (1950).
44

Of course such cases may be found in

the legal history of other countries as
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follows. Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti were executed on
August 22, 1927, for allegedly having robbed and killed a shoe
company paymaster and guard in South Braintree, Massachusetts,
on April 15, 1921.'- Sacco and Vanzetti, both immigrants, anarchists, and draft resisters, were tried in a period when these characteristics provoked exceedingly hostile reactions from press, police, and public. The judge who tried the men, Webster Thayer,
repeatedly demonstrated the strongest animosity towards them.
Their radicalism, draft resistance, and Italian ancestry were all
made focal points of the trial by a prosecution that arranged for
the presentation of misleading, perhaps perjured, testimony.46
The jury that heard the case was exclusively American-born and
Protestant. It included at least one member who declared before
the trial that Sacco and Vanzetti should be hanged." Not surprisingly, the convictions and executions were widely viewed as
the product of Massachusetts' desire to "get" these foreign radicals.
Yet the case became a focal point of dialectical conflict within
Massachusetts and American society. On one hand, many of those
involved seemed bent on securing the state against the "red menace," no matter what the cost. In contrast, many others saw the
case as a gross affront to notions of decency and fair play. The
well. See, e.g.,J.-D. BREDIN, THE AFFAIR: THE CASE OF ALFRED DREYFUS (1983) (French miscarriage of justice involving Jewish military officer); C. MULLIN, ERROR OF JUDGMENT: THE
BIRMINGHAM BOMBINGS (1986) (British miscarriage of justice involving Irish workers accused of IRA bombings); A. NOYES, THE ACCUSING GHOST OR JUSTICE FOR CASEMENT
(1957) (British miscarriage of justice involving distinguished Irish nationalist accused of
treason during First World War).
45 My description of the Sacco-Vanzetti case is based upon the following sources unless otherwise indicated: F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1927); L
JOUGHIN & E. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO AND VANzETI (1948); F. RUSSELL, TRAGEDY IN DEDHAM (1962); W. YOUNG & D. KAISER, POSTMORTEM: NEW EVIDENCE IN THE
CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1985).

46 By prior arrangement with the prosecution a ballistics expert for the state, Captain William Proctor of the Massachusetts State Police, testified that one of the fatal bullets was "consistent with" having been fired from Sacco's pistol. This evidence was intentionally designed to mislead the jury into thinking that Sacco's gun had been the murder weapon. The testimony was fabricated after Proctor told the prosecution that all he
could honestly say was that the bullet might have come from any one of thousands of
similar Colt pistols. 'See L JOUGHIN & E. MORGAN, supra note 45, at 14-16, 126-31. William Young and David Kaiser have argued that a great deal of the prosection's evidence
was knowingly falsified to "frame" Sacco and Vanzetti. See W. YOUNG & D. KAISER, supra
note 45 passim.
47 Jury foreman Harry Ripley declared to an acquaintance before the trial, "Damn
them, they ought to hang them anyway." Quoted in L JOUGHIN & E. MORGAN, supm
note 45, at 116.
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intensely conservative Boston Herald was eventually moved to publish an editorial, later awarded a Pulitzer Prize, in which it argued
that there were doubts about the integrity of the original trial s
In response to such sentiments the Governor eventually appointed
an Advisory Commission to review the case. Unfortunately, its
deliberations were no freer from prejudice than those of the trial
court and the men were condemned. But these tergiversations
demonstrate that Massachusetts was locked in a struggle with its
conscience. Although the state yielded to prejudice and executed
the defendants, the case served as a rallying point for those who
opposed the prevailing ideology and demonstrated the moral vulnerability of that ideology. Vanzetti prophetically described his
role as martyr in the cause of justice:
If it had not been for these things, I might have live out
my life talking at street corners to scorning men. I might have
die, unmarked, unknown, a failure. Now we are not a failure.
This is our career and our triumph. Never in the our full life
can we hope to do such work for tolerance, for joostice, for
man's onderstanding of man, as we do now by an accident.
Our words-our lives-our pains-nothingl The taking of
our lives-lives of a good Shoemaker and a poor fish-peddler-all!9 That last moment belong to us-that agony is our tri4
umph
The case not only illustrates the ability of courts, lawyers and jurors to act brutally and unfairly, but also the ability of various
constituencies to challenge such actions. A study of the trial of
Sacco and Vanzetti may help young lawyers to focus on the conflict between what society seems to demand and the dictates of con50
science.
Similar benefits may be derived from a study of the prosecution of the so-called Scottsboro "boys." In 1932 an armed posse
removed nine young black men from a freight train passing
through northern Alabama. 5' They were arrested because a white
48 Id. at 248 (the editorial, entitled We Submit, was written by F. Lauriston Bullard
and was the Heralds's response to Judge Thayer's October 23, 1926 denial of the
defendants' motion for a new trial).
49 Quoted in D. FELIX, PROTEST: SACCO-VANZETTI AND THE INTELLECTUALS 178
(1965).
50 Despite the foregoing, it should not be concluded that the men were beyond all
doubt, innocent. There is substantial circumstantial evidence of Sacco's guilt. See F. RUSSELL, supra note 45, at 463-67; see generally F. RUSSELL, SACCO AND VANZETrI: THE CASE
RESOLVED (1986). What is unavoidable, nonetheless, is the grotesquely unfair manner in
which they were tried and condemned.
51 The description of the Scottsboro "boys" is based upon the following sources:
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youth had complained about being beaten and forced from the
train. When the train was stopped it was discovered that two
young white women were also aboard. Shortly thereafter, the
young women accused the black "boys" of rape. After narrowly
escaping a lynching, the accused were hastily put on trial in
Scottsboro, Alabama. The "boys" were provided no counsel until
the day of the trial and the lawyers who eventually represented
them were hampered by a variety of impediments including the
constant threat of mob violence and severe personal disabilities.5 2 The trials were concluded in the span of three days and
the defendants were condemned to death. The Alabama Supreme
Court upheld their convictions with only a single judge dissenting.5" It was not until the case reached the Supreme Court of
the United States that any judicial body was moved to declare
their treatment unfair.
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions and sent the
case back to Alabama for a new trial.54 Over the course of the
next four years there were a series of seven trials and a second
reversal of convictions by the Supreme Court.5 5 At all, of these
trials, one of the two alleged rape victims testified on behalf of
the defendants that there had been no rape. Furthermore, strong
medical evidence was adduced that the women's condition was
inconsistent with there having been a violent assault and that
several of the defendants were physically incapable of carrying out
a rape. Not once, however, did an Alabama jury acquit any of the
defendants. Eventually the case was settled with a compromise
that resulted in the freeing of four of the nine "boys." As with
Sacco and Vanzetti, the case demonstrates the willingness of a
prejudiced and hostile majority to act unjustly. And, like its Massachusetts counterpart, the Scottsboro litigation served as a rallying point for those who recognized the vicious nature of the racial animus that dictated the trial results. The case was one of the
first rays of light in the otherwise dark sky of Southern racism
and presaged the beginning of the civil rights movement.

Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); D.
CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969).
52 It has been demonstrated that one of the attorneys, Stephen Roddy, had a serious drinking problem and the other, Milo Moody, was becoming senile. See D. CARTER,
supra note 51, at 18-19.
53 See Powell v. State, 224 Ala. 540, 144 So. 201 (1932).
54 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
55 See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
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These cases, and others like them,5" expose to scrutiny the
dialectical struggle that may take place in society when its strongest prejudices come squarely into conflict with its promise to
treat all defendants in an evenhanded and fair manner. They also
seem to define a boundary beyond which legal action should not
be pressed. Transgressing this boundary invites sharp protest and
kindles efforts to restore judicial integrity. This pattern of transgression and subsequent restraint is similar to that observed by
Isaac Balbus concerning judicial behavior during the urban riots
of the late 1960s.5 ' Balbus found that under the immediate pressure of civil disorders the courts seemed to abandon due process.
Once some semblance of order had been restored, however, he
observed that the courts once more began to insist on the rigorous enforcement of procedural protections. Balbus argued that
this pattern manifests the ruling elite's concern to maintain both
its grip on power and the appearance of the rule of law, a necessity to insure the long term legitimacy of the court system.
The satanic cases follow a similar pattern. For a variety of
social, economic and political reasons the courts at times seem to
lose their senses. Prejudice, fear, and anger overrule decency and
fairness. This pattern cannot continue unchecked if the system is
to retain the respect and support of society at large. Protests increase and eventually the system disavows its prior behavior.
Quite often, as in both Sacco-Vanzetti and Scottsboro, this disavowal comes too late for the original victims who, in essence,
serve'as martyrs to the cause of restoring justice.
Studying the satanic cases may yield a variety of benefits.
Foremost among them is the opportunity to examine, face to
face, the demonic tendencies of the law. When such tendencies
are openly confronted, students may begin to identify the critical
moral issues arising out of the practice of their profession. In
such cases the risk of doing harm is made graphically dear yet, as
Noonan points out, the historical nature of the materials provide

56 See, e.g., P. AvRICH, THE HAYmARKET TRAGEDY (1984) (describing injustice of
prosecution of so-called "Haymarket Bombers," Chicago anarchist labor leaders accused
of a bombing murder in 1886); R. RADosH & J. MILTON, THE ROSENBERG FILE: A
SEARCH FOR THE TRuTH (1983) (detailing misconduct in prosecution of Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg in 1951). Alternatively, it would be possible to construct a course around
other historically infamous trails like those of Socrates, Jesus, and Thomas More.
57 See I. BALBUS, THE DIALECTICS OF LEGAL REPRESSION: BLACK REBELS BEFORE THE
AMERicAN CRIMINAL COURTS (1973). The following analysis is based upon Balbus's work
unless otherwise noted.
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sufficient distance so that the temptation to "disguise, rationalize,
or accommodate" is diminished."8 In such a setting students may
come to realize that practice is fraught with personal decisions
that require deep thought about values. When young lawyers realize that they will have to face hatred, prejudice, and stupidity,
their own as well as others, they are at least forewarned about the
problems they may face and afforded an opportunity to prepare
to meet them. Furthermore, understanding that there are judges
like Webster Thayer provides a profound caution and perhaps
arms young lawyers to deal more effectively with the demands
authority will seek to make upon them.
If the materials studied are carefully selected the students
may also find role models worthy of emulation. William
Thompson's great integrity and tenacity in representing Sacco and
Vanzetti, despite the severe damage the case did to his practice
and standing in Boston's legal community,"S provides a model of
attorney fortitude and courage. The willingness of Samuel
Liebowitz to face a howling mob and ignore threats to his life
while seeking justice for the Scottsboro "boys"6" is similarly inspiring. Even in the most awful circumstances some heroic men
and women have demonstrated a willingness to stand up and
fight for justice. Their example is a precious lesson to communicate to young lawyers. It may also serve as a link between outstanding lawyers and altruists of other sorts who, throughout history, have risked everything to do what they think is right. It
connects the practice of law with the samaritanism exhibited by
people like Andre Trocm6, 6 ' Georges Picquart, 62 and Oscar
Schindler.

63

The satanic cases may be used to teach a host of other lessons as well. They dramatically present all sorts of ethical dilemmas from prosecutorial overreaching and judicial misconduct to

58
59
60

See sup=s text preceding note 19 (quoting J. NOONAN, supra note 10, at 88).
See L JOUGHIN & E. MORGAN, supra note 45, at 319-20, 354-56.
See D. CARTER, supra note 51 passim.

61

See P. HALLE, LEsr INNOcENT BLOOD BE SHED: THE STORY OF THE VILLAGE OF

LE CHAMBON AND How GOODNESS HAPPENED THERE (1979) (Trocm6 was the minister
and leader of the small town of Le Chambon and under his guidance the town became
a haven for Jews fleeing the Nazis).
62 See J.-D. BREDIN, supra note 44 passim (Lieutenant Colonel Picquart was a French
Army officer who risked a very promising career to fight the unjust conviction of Alfred
Dreyfus).
63 See T. KENEALLY, SCHINDLER'S LIST 1 (1982) (Schindler was a German industrialist
who risked all he had in an effort to save Jews from the holocaust).
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defense counsel subornation of perjury. They provide real-world
motives for such behavior and underscore the difficulty of choosing to act ethically. Cases like Sacco-Vanzetti and Scottsboro also
raise profound questions about the validity of the death penalty.
When the state can execute on the basis of grotesquely unfair
proceedings the danger implicit in every death sentence becomes
readily apparent. The irreconcilability of an intrinsically vulnerable
justice system and an irreversible sanction is plainly intimated.6 4
These sorts of cases also provide exceptional vehicles for the
rehearsal of certain advocacy skills. In the context of a rich set of
factual materials, such as those provided by a good case study,
young lawyers can begin to explore ways to fashion a sound and
appealing theory of the case.6" Classroom discussion of this intensely practical problem has the added advantage of emphasizing
for student lawyers that good advocacy requires profoundly human and creative thinking as well as legal acumen. The materials
help expose the trial as a problem in intepersonal communications. A technically correct voir dire, opening, and cross-examination are not enough to win cases. Common sense and persuasion
are the essence of the matter.
It is hard to measure the impact of these cases on young
lawyers. When I last taught a course focusing on the sort of cases
I have described, 6 I asked my students to write a brief description of what impact, if any, the course had on their thinking
about being lawyers, about the role of judges in the adjudicatory
system, about the problem of achieving justice. I got a range of
replies. One student candidly acknowledged that the course "honestly had no effect on either [his/her] frame of reference, morality or ethics."67 At least half a dozen, however, felt that the

64 See C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE
(1974).
65 On the importance of the theory of the case, see Imwinkelried, The Development
of ProfessionalJudgment in Law School Litigation Couses: The Concepts of Trial Theoy and
Theme, 39 VAND. L. REv. 59 (1986).
66 My course is entitled "When Justice Fails." It is offered for three semester hours
of credit. It is generally taken by second semester first-year students though it is open to
upper-level students as well. The class usually has 40 to 50 enrollees. It begins with a set
of theoretical materials including excerpts from I. BALBUS, supra note 57; E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT (1975) and my monograph
concerning the adversary system, S. LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM.: A DESCRIPTION
AND DEFENSE (1984). It then explores four famous miscarriages of justice. In this year's
class I used the following- L JOUGHIN & E. MORGAN, supra note 45; R. CARTER, supra
note 51; R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra note 56; and J.-D. BREDIN, supra note 44.
67 Original responses on file with the author.
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course had shown them "how fragile the system really is." 68 A
majority said they had begun to examine more critically the parts
played by both lawyers and judges. A somewhat smaller number69 said they had begun to see the importance of moral and
ethical constraints on all the actors in the process and had become sensitized to "the disasters which occur when the players
[do] not act ethically." Some went a step further and indicated
that they had "become aware that our best safeguard against such
failure is vigilance, our own ethical conduct, and constant concern
for our fellow human beings." These responses are not overwhelming proof of the efficacy of the study of satanic cases but
they do suggest that the consideration of such materials can spark
student examination of some critically important issues that are
generally not addressed in the law school curriculum.

68 The numerical calculations presented in this and the following sentences were
based on the 29 responses I received from my class of 40 students. It, should be noted
that at least half of those not responding were absent when the questions were asked.
69 Approximately 12 of my 29 student respondents so indicated.

